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主講人：尹興強 博士

時間：2021年1月13日14:00開始

地點：bwin必贏唯一官網324室

騰訊會議ID：678549903

歡迎大家參加！

主講人簡介

尹興強，男，四川達州人。本科與碩士畢業(yè)于石河子大學（財務管理專業(yè)），目前為上海財經大學會計學專業(yè)博士研究生（將于2021年6月畢業(yè)）。主要研究興趣為審計、信息披露與大數(shù)據時代的財務會計研究。已在《經濟研究》《管理世界》《會計研究》《China Economic Review》《China Journal of Accounting Studies》等國內外權威學術期刊發(fā)表論文多篇。先后主持新疆維吾爾自治區(qū)研究生科研創(chuàng)新項目1項、上海財經大學研究生創(chuàng)新基金項目1項、上海財經大學會計學院與大華會計師事務所共建聯(lián)合研究項目1項。作為主要成員參與省部級以上課題4項。曾獲得大學生國家獎學金、國家勵志獎學金、研究生國家獎學金、全國大學生春節(jié)“錢”主題征文全國三等獎、新疆第八屆研究生學術論壇三等獎、新疆第七屆研究生學術論壇優(yōu)秀獎、新疆維吾爾自治區(qū)優(yōu)秀畢業(yè)論文、上海市“應用微觀計量經濟學”暑期學校優(yōu)秀論文獎、徐政旦獎學金、優(yōu)秀學生、優(yōu)秀黨員等榮譽。

報告簡介

The recent ground-breaking reforms of auditing standards require auditors to disclose critical audit matters (CAM), which greatly enhance the informativeness and flexibility of audit report. This study investigates whether managers will utilize that flexibility to convey private information to investors, and whether auditors will certify that information. Based on a sample of CAMs disclosed by listed firms on China stock markets, we find that for firms with severe financial constraint and scarce analyst coverage, auditors tend to disclose more CAMs and audit responses in audit reports, and auditors are more likely to provide confirmative comments. Further analyses find that firms with confirmative CAMs have lower cost of capital, positive short-term market reaction, higher value relevance and ERC, and higher long-term market valuation. With regards to incentives of firms, we find that the communicating effect of CAMs primarily exists in firms with private owners, headquartered in regions with poor financial development, and with higher level of information uncertainty and financial risk. The certifying effect is more pronounced for firms located in regions with poor financial development, with higher level of information uncertainty and growth potential. With regards to incentives of auditors, we find that auditors tend to charge higher audit fees when helping firms to convey information, are less likely to certify the CAMs when firms engage in more earnings management, and the client importance has no impact on the disclosure of CAMs. Such results indicate that auditors take litigation risk and reputation penalty into consideration when helping firms to communicate and certify private information. The content analysis finds that for firms with severe financial constraint and scarce analyst coverage, the CAMs tend to be more readable, more positive and less boilerplate. Overall, the empirical results demonstrate that CAMs can help to communicate and certify private information of certain firms.